Predicting Financial Crisis in Developing Economies: Astronomy or Astrology? by Ilene Grabel
243
Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 2003








As with the 1990s, the 2000s are proving to be a fruitful time for those involved
in the project of developing predictors of financial crisis in developing economies.
Indeed, the occurrence of a financial crisis in the previous eighteen months seems a
rather reliable predictor of the development of new predictors! Neoclassical econo-
mists have sought to develop reliable predictors of currency, banking and generalized
financial crises following the European currency crisis of 1992-93, the Mexican fi-
nancial crisis of 1994-95, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 [Berg and Pattillo,
1998; Edison, 2000; Frankel and Rose, 1996; Goldstein, 1997a, 1997b; Hardy and
Pazarbasioglu, 1998; Kamin and Babson, 1999; Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart,
1997; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; Sachs, Tornell, Velasco, 1996].1 The most ambi-
tious of these efforts involves drawing together several crisis predictors to create
“early warning systems” that can be employed by policymakers, regulators and in-
vestors (the gold standard of such efforts is Goldstein, Kaminsky, Reinhart [2000]).
Unfortunately, the empirical record of crisis predictors is rather poor. Predictors
developed after the European currency crisis failed to predict the events in Mexico,
predictors developed after the Mexican crisis failed to predict the Asian crisis, and
predictors developed after the Asian crisis failed to predict the 2001 Turkish crisis
[Corbett and Vines, 1998; Eichengreen, 1999; Sharma, 1999]. The current crisis in
Argentina was also not predicted by existing models.2 Additionally, counterfactual
tests indicate that existing predictors would not have predicted the very crises that
motivated their development [Berg and Pattillo, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache, 1999; Eichengreen and Portes, 1997; Goldfajn and Valdés, 1997; Hardy
and Pazarbasioglu, 1998]. Undaunted by empirical failure, however, the effort to
discover reliable crisis predictors (hereinafter, the neoclassical “predictors project”)
continues. So sure are neoclassical economists that a reasonable set of predictors can
be developed that a great deal of intellectual capital is being expended in efforts to
design an early warning system that will predict the next big financial crisis.
This paper critically examines the neoclassical predictors project on both empiri-
cal and theoretical grounds. The paper argues that these indicators perform poorly
on empirical grounds and also rejects them on theoretical grounds. From a post-
Keynesian perspective advanced notably by Minsky (among others), there is no rea-244 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
son to expect that the mere provision of accurate and timely information about the
changing state of “market fundamentals” in developing economies will prevent crisis
by changing agents’ behaviors. The neoclassical predictors project is based on several
misguided initial assumptions. First, in the context of a neoliberal policy environ-
ment, financial markets will self-regulate in a stabilizing manner provided that agents
have access to information that reveals the economy’s vulnerability to crisis and are
free to take the defensive actions that they deem warranted. In this view, the neoliberal
financial regime is entirely inculpable in the financial instability and recurrent cri-
ses that have proliferated during the era of neoliberal reform. Second, the informa-
tion on which the success of these predictors is predicated can reasonably be ex-
pected to be accurate. Third, the interpretation of predictors is exogenous to the eco-
nomic environment and the state of expectations.
The paper also proposes several indicators that are consonant with post-Keynesian
economic theory, although it will be argued that these indicators themselves do not
represent a sufficient means to prevent financial crisis in developing economies. Ironi-
cally, as agents develop confidence in the predictive capacity of crisis indicators, they
may be more likely to engage in actions that increase the economy’s vulnerability to
crisis. Moreover, the dissemination of information about the economy’s vulnerability
to a crisis may in fact accelerate investor exit, thereby bringing about precisely the
crisis that the indicators are designed to predict. Far more important to the project of
preventing financial crisis in developing economies is the implementation of con-
straints on those investor behaviors that render them prone to currency, banking
and financial crises. Hence, the intellectual capital of the economics profession could
be more productively expended devising appropriate changes in the overall regime in
which investors operate (such as measures that compel changes in financing strate-
gies) rather than searching for the correct set of crisis predictors.
The paper is organized in the following manner. It begins by assessing the neo-
classical predictors project. It examines the range of indicators that have been devel-
oped and reviews their empirical performance. It then develops a post-Keynesian
critique of the neoclassical predictors project, arguing among other things that the
information yielded by predictors can in fact induce the very crises they are designed
to avert. It continues by presenting a set of predictors that are consistent with post-
Keynesian theory, but acknowledges that these, too, are insufficient policy tools to
avert crisis. I argue that predictors can contribute to crisis prevention only if they
operate in the context of an overall policy regime in which investor options and mar-
ket volatility are constrained by governmental action. In this connection I present
proposals for trip wires and speed bumps to regulate agents’ behavior. As such, they
reach far beyond dissemination of information, the hallmark of the predictors project.
THE NEOCLASSICAL PREDICTORS PROJECT
The neoclassical predictors project begins from the premise that (many) financial
crises can be prevented provided that economic actors know the extent of an economy’s
vulnerability (either in the aggregate, or in regards to weaknesses in the banking
sector or the currency). Adequate provision of this knowledge in the form of indi-
vidual predictors or a set of predictors packaged as an early warning system is a245 PREDICTING FINANCIAL CRISIS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
sufficient condition for crisis prevention. This is because rational economic agents
are assumed to respond to information about crisis potentialities in ways that pre-
vent realization of the predicted crisis. Participants in the neoclassical predictors
project do not advocate any sort of regulatory or governmental response to the dan-
gers revealed by predictors. The defensive postures adopted by private actors—them-
selves made possible only by unfettered markets—are a sufficient means to ward off
the predicted crisis. Thus, micro level reactions by market actors are stabilizing at
the macro level.
The logic of the neoclassical approach to predictors is rather straightforward.
The predictor is assumed to be independent of the predictor and event. From this
perspective, crisis prevention requires two things: good predictors that fill informa-
tion gaps and an open, liberalized regime in which agents are free to reallocate or
liquidate their portfolios in response to problems made apparent by predictors. Hence,
the self-regulating actions that rational agents take in response to predictors will
prevent the predicted event from coming to fruition (or at least will mitigate its se-
verity). The underlying logic of the neoclassical approach to predictors is summa-
rized in Figure 1.
The neoclassical approach assumes that once a dangerous economic tendency is
revealed, rational (private) economic actors will change their behavior in a manner
that ultimately stabilizes markets.
The Predictors Literature
Theoretical and empirical treatments of the etiology of currency crises is not a
new area of research in neoclassical macroeconomics. The starting point for theoreti-
cal treatments of the subject is Krugman’s seminal 1979 paper on the circumstances
that lead to the collapse of fixed/pegged exchange rate regimes. Krugman maintains
that such regimes collapse under the pressure of weak fundamentals—to wit: exces-
sively expansionary monetary and/or fiscal policies or persistent balance of payments
deficits render fixed/pegged currencies untenable. Extensions of Krugman [1979] are
legion; in these elaborations, weak fundamentals play a central role in triggering
FIGURE 1
The Logic of Neoclassical Predictors Operating
in the Context of a Neoliberal Regime
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currency crises. The earliest extensions of Krugman (termed first generation models)
focus on the role of monetary and/or fiscal imbalances in speculative attacks against
a multiplicity of exchange rate regimes; later extensions (termed second generation
models) center on the possibility for multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling attacks on a
currency following the deterioration of fundamentals.3 The European currency crisis
of 1992 reinvigorated efforts to understand the causes of currency crises; important
works in this regard include Eichengreen and Wyplosz [1993], Eichengreen, Rose,
Wyplosz [1995] and Rose and Svensson [1994]. Neither the work in the post-Krugman
tradition nor the work of the Europeanists attempted to develop explicit predictors of
financial crisis.
It was not until the 1994-95 Mexican crisis that neoclassical economists moved
beyond the project of uncovering the causes of crisis and attempted to establish pre-
dictors of financial crisis in developing economies. Official efforts to understand the
Mexican crisis were very much guided by the view that crises could be prevented
through the provision of accurate and timely information about conditions in develop-
ing economies. The central role of information in crisis prevention was indeed the
main message of the June 1995 Group of Seven Summit held in Halifax in the wake of
the Mexican crisis. At Halifax, the IMF was urged to encourage the prompt publica-
tion of economic and financial statistics and to identify regularly countries that did
not comply with the institution’s new information standards (standards that eventu-
ally became the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard or SDDS).4 The neoclas-
sical predictors project builds directly on the IMF’s failed efforts to prevent crises in
Asia through the provision of information through the SDDS.
Participants in the neoclassical predictors project propose two broad types of pre-
dictors—the “regression” or “probit” approach associated with Frankel and Rose [1996]
and the more frequently discussed early warning system (often termed the “signal
extraction”) approach associated with Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart [2000].5
The regression approach estimates the probability of a currency or a banking
crisis and identifies the variables that are statistically correlated with crisis. Econo-
metric work by Frankel and Rose [1996] and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco [1996] ex-
emplifies this approach to crisis prediction. For example, Frankel and Rose [1996]
conclude that currency crashes occur when foreign direct investment dries up, when
currency reserves are low and falling, when domestic credit growth is high, when
Northern nominal interest rates rise, and when the real exchange rate is overvalued
by 10 percent.
The early warning system approach compares the behavior of a variable before a
crisis with its behavior during normal times. A variable is then taken to be useful if
it displays anomalous behavior before a crisis but does not provide false signals of an
impending crisis in normal times. When a variable exceeds or falls below a certain
threshold, it is said to issue a signal that a crisis may occur.
Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart [2000] is the point of departure for all efforts
to develop early warning systems.6 Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart [2000] find
that a systemic pattern of empirical abnormalities lead up to most currency and
banking crises in developing economies over a sample period ranging from 1970-95.
They find that for monthly data the best predictors of currency crises are apprecia-
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prices, a fall in exports, a high ratio of broad money (M2) to international reserves,
and a recession. Among the annual predictors of currency crises, the two most reli-
able predictors are a large current account deficit relative to both GDP and invest-
ment. They find that using monthly data the most reliable predictors of banking
crisis (in descending order of importance) are appreciation of the real exchange rate
(relative to trend), a decline in stock prices, a rise in the M2 money multiplier, a
decline in real output, a fall in exports, and a rise in the real interest rate.7 Among
the annual predictors of banking crises, the most reliable are a high ratio of short-
term capital inflows to GDP and a large current account deficit relative to invest-
ment. In most banking and currency crises, a high proportion of the monthly leading
indicators—on the order of 50-75 percent—reach their signaling threshold. In other
words, when a developing economy is moving toward a financial crisis, many of the
leading indicators signal a crisis.
Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart [2000] show that the performance of leading
indicators varies; warnings usually appear ten to eighteen months prior to the onset
of a crisis. The authors remain firm in their view that the early warning system can
make an economy’s vulnerability to crisis apparent. They do make clear, however,
that the system does not address the timing of a crisis.
The Empirical Performance of Predictors
The empirical performance of crisis predictors is rather dismal. Numerous em-
pirical tests (many indeed conducted by proponents) conclude that predictors would
not have provided ex-ante signals of the events in Mexico or Asia.
For example, Flood and Marion [1999], Hawkins and Klau [2000], and the IMF
[1998, Ch. 4] all conclude that predictors have, at best, a mixed record of success.
Goldfajn and Valdes [1997] and Hardy and Pazarbasioglu [1998] are less ambiguous:
the former study concludes that exchange rate crises are largely unpredictable events,
a result they demonstrate in the case of the currency crises in Mexico and Thailand;
the latter study concludes that the Asian banking crises would not have been pre-
dicted by the usual macroeconomic predictors. Eichengreen’s [1999] survey of predic-
tors concludes that they have remarkably poor power [Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz,
1995]. His assessment is worth quoting at length: “If investors, with so much at
stake, cannot reliably forecast crises, then it is hard to see why bureaucrats should
do better…Their [predictors] track record is not good. Models built to explain the
1992-93 ERM crisis did not predict the 1994-95 Mexican crisis. Models built to ex-
plain the Mexican crisis did not predict the Asian crisis” [Eichengreen, 1999, 84].
Several studies test a comprehensive battery of predictors; these studies, too, fail
to offer empirical support to the neoclassical predictors project. In a test of nearly all
existing predictors (both of the regression and the early warning variety), Berg and
Pattillo [1998] find that some models perform better than guesswork in predicting
the Asian crisis. But they find that none of these models reliably predicts the timing
of the crisis (that is, whether there would be a crisis in 1997). This is because false
alarms, in almost all cases, always outnumber appropriate warnings. Edison [2000]
also concludes that early warning systems issue many false alarms and miss impor-
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systems concludes that they would not have predicted the events in Asia (a conclu-
sion echoed by Corbett and Vines [1998]). Sharma sums up the matter definitively:
“the holy grail of crisis prediction may be intrinsically unattainable” [1999, 42].
The most prominent advocates of predictors remain unshaken by the weight of
discouraging empirical evidence. Goldstein [1997b], for example, concludes that pre-
liminary tests of the predictors he develops indicate that they would have predicted
the Thai crisis. Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart [2000] conclude that their system
performs quite well, not only in tracking currency and banking crises in developing
economies over the 1970-95 sample period, but also in anticipating most of the coun-
tries affected by the Asian crisis (particularly as regards currency crises in Asia).8 To
their credit, the authors clearly acknowledge that their early warning system is prone
to many false alarms and would have missed some important crises: the best indica-
tors send a significant share of false alarms on the order of one false alarm for every
2-5 true signals [ibid., Ch. 5].
The empirical shortcomings of the neoclassical predictors project are clear, even
to some of its most ardent participants. What is not clear is why efforts to refine
existing predictors and to develop new ones proceed despite the empirical failings of
the enterprise.
A POST-KEYNESIAN VIEW OF PREDICTORS
From a post-Keynesian perspective, the neoclassical predictors project is based
on several misguided initial assumptions. The collective weight of these logical prob-
lems (coupled with the empirical failure of predictive exercises) frustrates the neo-
classical enterprise of crisis prediction.
Recall that the neoclassical predictors project begins from the presumption that
the provision of accurate and timely information about an economy’s vulnerability is
ultimately market stabilizing, provided that agents are able to adopt appropriate
defensive postures in response to this information (see Figure 1). Post-Keynesians
reject this view for a number of reasons.
1. Agents can respond to new information in a manner that is either
market stabilizing or destabilizing.
In the post-Keynesian view, the idea that predictors and events are independent
of one another does not make sense. By making agents aware of fragilities in the
economy, predictors may induce market-stabilizing or destabilizing changes in be-
havior. This is because, from a post-Keynesian perspective, predictors and crises (as
events) are entirely dependent on one another. Given endogenous expectations and
the inherent instability of liquid, liberalized, internationally integrated financial
markets, rational economic actors are just as likely to engage in destabilizing herd
behavior in response to new information as they are to engage in market-stabilizing
behavior. In the game of musical chairs, no one wants to be the last one left standing,
as Keynes noted long ago. We simply cannot predict with certainty whether agents
will respond to the information provided by predictors in a market-destabilizing or
stabilizing manner. In light of recent events (for example, the collapse of Enron and249 PREDICTING FINANCIAL CRISIS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
several other corporations in the United States, Argentina’s financial crisis), inves-
tor panic seems a likely response to warnings of dire circumstances ahead.
The logic of the post-Keynesian understanding of predictors is presented in Fig-
ure 2. In the context of a neoliberal financial regime (in which agents are free to take
defensive actions in response to new information, changes in market sentiment, and
so on), predictors have indeterminate effects on macroeconomic stability.
From the post-Keynesian perspective, we discover what I will call the “predictor
credibility paradox.” In short, the enhanced credibility of a predictor may subvert its
capability to predict. To the degree that a predictor induces a heightened level of
confidence among economic actors, it may introduce and validate risky behaviors
that bring about a crisis. Thus, the degree of confidence with which predictors are
held influences the way that predictors themselves will move markets. Crises result
from the behavior of agents, and the behavior of agents is predicated on expectations
which are, in turn, a function of their “knowledge.” So a predictor becomes yet an-
other piece of information that can change the behavior of agents for better or worse.
Predictors, then, do not report on the future in a neutral way—they can induce changes
in investor behavior that can be market stabilizing or destabilizing.
2. The informational prerequisites for early warning systems are simply
unreasonable in the developing economy context.
The success of neoclassical predictors depends very much on the accuracy and
availability of information about a range of economic conditions. But these informa-
tional prerequisites cannot be accommodated in the developing economy context.
Problems of data inaccuracy are to be expected. Indeed, identification of precisely
this problem motivated the IMF’s creation of the SDDS. But identification of the
problem has not solved it. For instance, the IMF has acknowledged that important
data have been mis-reported by authorities in Ukraine [NYT, 5/5/00]. False and missed
alarms are likely as long as the integrity of data are compromised. And false alarms
are obviously no small matter insofar as they can trigger real crises by causing an
investor panic. Moreover, governments have a strong incentive to misreport data
once a “predictors regime” is in place, and this incentive deepens as a country enters
crisis territory. Paradoxically, then, the introduction of predictors is likely to reduce
the quality of reported data.
FIGURE 2
The Logic of Post-Keynesian Predictors Operating in the Context
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Even in the United States, the quality of economic data is far from ideal. The
Federal Reserve and various departments of the U.S. government issue ex post ad-
justments of data as a matter of course. For example, the dating of business cycles is
always subject to ex post adjustment; the accuracy of data on U.S. productivity has
been the subject of much discussion of late [NYT, 9/5/01; 10/17/01; 11/30/01]. The
need for ex post revision (and/or disputes about methodology) may cause little prob-
lem when the matter at stake is the dating of recessions (or calculating productivity
growth), since this news is unlikely to affect behaviors in consequential ways. But
inaccurate data reporting in the context of predicting crisis is another matter en-
tirely. In this context, inaccuracies are not benign.
3. The interpretation of predictors is endogenous to the economic
environment.
The neoclassical predictors project presumes that the interpretation of predic-
tors is a science rather than an art. The former implies that the determination as to
what constitutes a “dangerous reading” is independent of the economic climate and
the state of expectations. In contrast, post-Keynesians view the interpretation of
predictors as far more art than science.9 The determination as to what constitutes a
dangerous level for some set of predictive variables is endogenous to the economic
environment. The changing interpretation of price/earnings ratios on the U.S. stock
exchange over the previous two years is a case in point. The same price-earning
ratios demonstrated the emergence of a “new economy” in the context of buoyant
expectations, and evidence of serious problems in the context of the emergence of
recessionary expectations.
4. Neoclassical predictors are predicated on the false notion that a
consistent set of knowable macroeconomic fundamentals (embodied in
predictors) exists and that economic agents make decisions based on a
rational assessment of these fundamentals.
At its base, the predictors developed by neoclassical economists begin from the
assumption that a set of objective fundamentals exists, that these fundamentals are
knowable, and that rational agents make decisions based on the state of fundamen-
tals. From a post-Keynesian perspective, of course, there is no set of static, knowable
fundamentals in the domain of investment decisions. As Keynes’ [1964] beauty con-
test and musical chairs analogies make clear, investment decisions are made in an
environment of fundamental uncertainty, are driven by expectations and conven-
tional wisdom, and are characterized by herd effects. Hence, when agents believe
they are making rational investment decisions based on objective fundamentals, they
fail to recognize that the identification of fundamentals is itself largely an interpre-
tative exercise. For example, a rising current account deficit may be taken as a sign
of an impending crisis and a reflection of underlying economic fragility, or may be
taken as a reflection of a country’s strength and desirability to investors.
Moreover, if the etiology of every crisis is at least slightly different, we have no
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mentals would be appropriate for the job. For example, the root causes of the Ex-
change Rate Mechanism, Mexican, and Asian crises remain distinct. Therefore, it
comes as no surprise that predictors developed after each crisis failed to predict the
next one [Corbett and Vines, 1998].
5. Refining existing neoclassical predictors will not end the pattern of
recurrent crisis in developing economies. The problem lies with the regime:
regimes of neoliberal finance are inherently prone to crisis, particularly
in the developing economy context.
The search for predictors by neoclassical economists assumes that crises are a
consequence of informational inadequacy rather than a fundamental, structural fea-
ture of the economic environment of regimes of neoliberal finance. Economies with
internationally integrated, liquid, liberalized financial systems are inherently crisis
prone, as Keynes long argued and recent events have well shown. (Arestis and
Demetriades [1997], Arestis and Glickman [2002], papers in Chang, Palma, and
Whittaker [2001], Crotty and Lee [2001], Grabel [2003; 2002; 1995], Nissanke and
Stein [2003], Palma [1998], Singh and Weisse [1998] and Weller [2001] treat this
issue in the context of developing economies; numerous post-Keynesians, such as
Davidson [1972] and Minsky [1986] treat this issue in the context of wealthy coun-
tries.)
Neoclassical economists fail to appreciate that the neoliberal financial regime
that they promote in developing countries plays a critical role in the promulgation of
the very financial crises that they now seek to predict. In particular, the promotion of
highly liquid, internationally integrated capital markets in these countries—in the
context of insufficient financial and regulatory architecture—plays an important role
in explaining many recent crises. Consistent with the assumptions of post-Keynesian
theory, several empirical studies show that financial liberalization in developing coun-
tries is a strong (and, in some cases, the best) predictor of banking, currency and/or
generalized financial crises [Corbett and Vines (quoting Wyplosz), 1998; Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Weller, 2001]. (Empirical evidence that links financial
liberalization and financial crisis is also reviewed in Arestis and Demetriades [1997],
Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick [2000], and Williamson and Mahar [1998]).10
6. Economists have never succeeded in predicting economic turning points
Finally, it bears mentioning that efforts at divining market swings have never
met with much success. The spectacular failure of the hedge fund, Long Term Capi-
tal Management, a fund managed by Nobel Laureates and other distinguished econo-
mists, demonstrates that even pioneers of elaborate risk management models can-
not anticipate market shifts with great accuracy.11 Developing economies simply can-
not afford to bear the costs of failed efforts at crisis prediction (namely, false signals
that trigger investor panics, or missed signals).252 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Some Necessary Tools for Crisis Curtailment in Developing Economies
Now that we have considered the empirical and theoretical failures of the neo-
classical predictors project, we turn to the practical matter of crisis curtailment from
a post-Keynesian perspective.
It is possible to envision “indicators of vulnerability,” or “trip wires” that are
compatible with post-Keynesian theory.12 (Those of us with a post-Keynesian per-
spective are far more comfortable with the terms indicator of vulnerability or trip
wire than we are with the term crisis predictor.) In this view, trip wires are a neces-
sary tool for ascertaining the particular vulnerabilities that confront an economy. A
post-Keynesian approach to assessing vulnerability accepts the neoclassical assump-
tion that indicators can, and indeed will, affect markets and sectoral performance
through their effect on the behavior of economic agents (see Figures 1 and 2). But
contrary to the neoclassical view, these trip wires are, at best, necessary to the task of
crisis prevention. Trip wires only represent a sufficient means of crisis curtailment if
they are firmly linked to changes in the institutional or regulatory context in which
economic actors operate.
On their own, trip wires have a rather narrow value as a diagnostic tool. With the
above caveats in mind (particularly those relating to informational adequacy), we
consider several trip wires that are consistent with post-Keynesian theory. Post-
Keynesian trip wires do not attempt to capture market fundamentals (having re-
jected their existence). Instead they attempt to measure the types of financial risks
to which developing economies are most prone.
1. Currency risk. Currency risk refers to the possibility that a country’s cur-
rency may experience a precipitous decline in value. Currency risk can be evidenced
by the ratio of official reserves to total short-term external obligations (the sum of
accumulated foreign portfolio investment and short-term hard-currency denominated
foreign borrowing); and the ratio of official reserves to the current account deficit.
2. Fragility risk. Fragility risk refers to the vulnerability of an economy’s pri-
vate and public borrowers to internal or external shocks that jeopardize their ability
to meet current obligations. Fragility risk arises in a number of ways. First, borrow-
ers might finance long-term obligations with short-term credit, causing “maturity
mismatch” (or what Minsky calls “Ponzi financing”). This leaves borrowers vulner-
able to changes in the supply of credit, and thereby exacerbates the ambient risk level
in the economy. Second, borrowers might contract debts that are repayable in foreign
currency, causing “locational mismatch.” This leaves borrowers vulnerable to cur-
rency depreciation/devaluation that may frustrate debt repayment. Third, agents
might finance private investment with capital that is highly subject to flight risk.
This dependence renders collateral values more volatile, and thereby reduces the
creditworthiness of borrowers just when they are most in need of funds.
Locational mismatch (that induces fragility risk) could be evidenced by the ratio
of foreign-currency denominated debt (with short-term obligations receiving a greater
weight in the calculation) to domestic-currency denominated debt. A proxy for matu-
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denominated obligations receiving a greater weight in the calculation) to long-term
debt. If this ratio and gross capital formation were both rising over time, that would
indicate the emergence of maturity mismatch.
3. Flight risk. Flight risk refers to the likelihood that holders of liquid financial
assets will sell their holdings en masse in the face of perceived difficulty. Lender
flight risk refers to the possibility that lenders will call loans or cease making new
loans in the face of perceived difficulty. Flight creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that
deflates asset and loan collateral values, induces bank distress and elevates ambient
economic risk. Flight risk can interact with currency risk to render the economy
vulnerable to financial crisis.
An indicator of lender flight risk is the ratio of official reserves to private and
public foreign-currency denominated debt (with short-term obligations receiving a
greater weight in the calculation). The vulnerability to portfolio investment flight
risk could be measured by the ratio of total accumulated foreign portfolio investment
to gross equity market capitalization or gross domestic capital formation.
4. Contagion risk. Contagion risk refers to the threat that a country will fall
victim to financial and macroeconomic instability that originates elsewhere. Indica-
tors of the vulnerability to contagion risk are difficult to envision, but a strategy for
reducing the likelihood that contagion threats will come to fruition will be discussed
below.
Sufficient Tools for Crisis Curtailment
For those engaged in the neoclassical predictors project, the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for crisis prevention are the operation of sound crisis predictors and
a neoliberal financial regime. The latter is critical insofar as neoclassicals assume
that the micro-level responses of economic actors to crisis predictors leads to out-
comes that are stabilizing on the macro level (see Figure 1). Therefore, economic
actors must be free to respond defensively to changes in the economic environment.
By contrast, from a post-Keynesian perspective, indicators of vulnerability (that
is, trip wires) are merely necessary to the task of curtailing crises. Moving from nec-
essary to sufficient conditions for crisis curtailment depends critically on institu-
tional and regulatory changes in the overall regime in which investors operate. In
what follows, I make a case for one such change—a “speed bump” initiative that is
tied directly to the post-Keynesian trip wires discussed above. The strategy of cou-
pling trip wires and speed bumps involves the development of a set of targeted, gradu-
ated policies that are activated whenever trip wires reveal particular vulnerabilities
in the economy.13
The trip wire-speed bump strategy is rather straightforward. Developing econo-
mies at the lowest, medium and highest levels of development might require distinct
trip-wire thresholds. Trip wires must be appropriately sensitive to subtle changes in
the risk environment and adjustable. Sensitive trip wires would allow policymakers
to activate graduated speed bumps at the earliest sign of heightened risk, well before
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a trip wire indicates that a country is approaching trouble, policymakers could then
immediately take steps to prevent crisis by activating speed bumps. Speed bumps
would target the type of risk that is developing with a graduated series of mitigation
measures that compel changes in financing and investment strategies and/or dampen
market liquidity.
Speed bumps can take many forms. Examples include measures that require
borrowers to unwind positions involving locational or maturity mismatches, curb the
pace of imports or foreign borrowing, limit the fluctuation or convertibility of the
currency, or slow the exit and particularly the entry of portfolio investment. I empha-
size the importance of speed bumps governing inflows rather than outflows because
measures that merely target outflows are more apt to trigger and exacerbate panic
than to prevent it. Thus, if trip wires revealed that a country was particularly vul-
nerable to the reversal of portfolio investment inflows, new inflows of portfolio in-
vestment would have to “wait at the gate” until domestic capital formation or gross
equity market capitalization increased sufficiently. Thus, speed bumps would slow
unsustainable financing patterns until a larger proportion of any increase in invest-
ment could be financed domestically.
Trip wires could indicate to policymakers and investors whether a country ap-
proached high levels of currency, fragility, and flight risk. The speed bump mecha-
nism provides policymakers with a means to manage measurable risks, and in doing
so, reduces the possibility that these risks will culminate in a national financial cri-
sis. Speed bumps affect investor behavior directly (for example, by forcing them to
wait at the gate, to unwind risky positions, and so on) and indirectly (by reducing
their anxiety about the future). Together, their effects mitigate the likelihood of cri-
sis. Those countries that have trip wires and speed bumps in place would also be less
vulnerable to contagion effects from crises that originate elsewhere (because they
would face lower levels of risk themselves).14 Figure 3 presents a schematic view of a
post-Keynesian approach to crisis curtailment (that is, a regime in which trip wires
activate speed bumps).
One important caveat bears mention. The risks introduced by off-balance sheet
activities, such as derivatives, cannot be revealed by trip wires (and hence can not be
curbed by speed bumps) insofar as data on these activities are largely unavailable. If
policymakers compelled actors to make these activities transparent, then trip wires
and speed bumps could be designed for them. In the absence of the will to enforce
transparency, policymakers in developing countries would be well advised to forbid
domestic actors from engaging in off-balance sheet activities.15
CONCLUSIONS
The trip-wire/speed-bump regime discussed here differs sharply from the neo-
classical predictors project. In keeping with neoclassical thought, the predictors project
is predicated on the view that financial crisis results particularly from imperfect
information and financial controls that prevent investors from responding defensively
to changes in the economic environment. From this perspective, the prevention of
crisis necessitates increased surveillance by the IMF tied to deepening neoliberal
reform to ensure that investors enjoy full information in the context of complete mar-255 PREDICTING FINANCIAL CRISIS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
kets . The trip-wire/speed-bump approach presumes instead with Keynes that better
information and intensification of neoliberal financial reform are insufficient to pre-
vent crises (indeed, these are likely to have perverse effects). From a post-Keynesian
perspective, warnings of potential danger (by way of a trip wire) must be coupled
with firm restrictions on investor behavior. Besides the temporary speed bumps de-
scribed here, these include permanent measures such as capital controls, restrictions
on currency convertibility, and the liquidity of portfolio investment, and extra-mar-
ket mechanisms of credit allocation.16
This paper has exposed the empirical and theoretical problems with the neoclas-
sical predictors project. It has attempted to develop a post-Keynesian approach to
crisis curtailment through a trip-wire/speed-bump approach that necessitates rather
stringent controls over investor freedoms. Critics of this approach might rightly raise
important considerations of political will, an issue outside our present scope of dis-
cussion. However, we are encouraged by the numerous recent challenges raised by
anti-WTO, anti-IMF, anti-neoliberal globalization activists on the matter of the he-
gemony of the neoliberal regime. Critics of the trip-wire/speed-bump approach might
also raise the concern that this approach would slow economic growth in developing
economies by slowing foreign investment inflows. But recent experience in Argen-
tina (and elsewhere) shows that the slower short-term growth these speed bumps
might induce are a worthwhile price to pay to avoid the instability created by a cur-
rency collapse and/or the sudden exit of external finance.
FIGURE 3
The Logic of a Post-Keynesian Approach to Crisis Curtailment
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NOTES
Paper presented at the session on “Financial Globalization” at the Eastern Economics Association
conference, Boston, MA, March 15-17, 2002. I am grateful to George DeMartino, an anonymous
referee, participants at the EEA conference sessions on Financial Globalization, Philip Arestis (the
organizer of the sessions and this special issue of the EEJ), and the editor of this Journal for critical
reactions to this paper. Peter Zawadzki and Rob Fortier provided outstanding research assistance.
1. The voluminous predictors literature is usefully reviewed in several works—Berg and Patillo [1998],
Edison [2000], Eichengreen [1999: ch. 6], Flood and Marion [1999], Goldfajn and Valdés [1997],
Gonzalez-Hermillosa [1999], Hardy [1998], Hawkins and Klau [2000], IMF [1998, Ch. 4], and Sharma
[1999]. It bears noting that not all neoclassical development economists view efforts to create predic-
tors as viable or sufficient to prevent crisis. Extensive references to the neoclassical predictors litera-
ture appear in the body of this paper.
2. See Grabel [2002] for discussion of the Argentine crisis.
3. The theoretical literature on currency crises is reviewed in Eichengreen [1999, App. B], Goldfajn and
Valdés [1997], and Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart [1997].
4. See Eichengreen and Portes [1997] and the papers collected in Kenen [1996] for a summary and
evaluation of the decisions taken at the Halifax Summit. These works also discuss the recommenda-
tions of the Rey Committee (formed at Halifax) and the decisions taken at the 1996 G7 Summit (in
Lyons) on crisis prevention and the need for information dissemination.
5. General descriptions of these two approaches draw on Edison [2000], Goldstein, Kaminsky and
Reinhart [2000], and Sharma [1999].
6. Reviews and extensions appear in Berg and Pattillo [1998], Edison [2000], Hardy and Pazarbasiouglu
[1998], Hardy [1998], Hawkins and Klau [2000], IMF [1998, Ch. 4], and Kamin and Babson [1999].
Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart [2000] draw on the “signals methodology” elaborated in Kaminsky
and Reinhart [1999] and other related work by these authors, for example, Goldstein [1997b],
Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart [1997], and Kaminsky and Reinhart [2000]. The description of the
authors’ empirical findings is taken from Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart [2000, Ch. 8].
7. Note that they find that banking crises in developing economies are harder to predict using monthly
data than are currency crises.
8. They acknowledge that their early warning system would neither have predicted difficulties in Indo-
nesia during the Asian crisis, nor Argentina’s difficulties following the Mexican crisis.
9. This hardly implies that economic performance is determined exclusively by interpretation.
10. Financial liberalization is a variable that rarely figures into neoclassical predictors of crisis. Kaminsky
and Reinhart [1999] are an exception among neoclassicals in this regard.
11. I thank James Crotty for bringing this point to my attention. See Lowenstein [2000] on the failure of
Long Term Capital Management.
12. The subsequent discussion of risk categories, trip wires, and speed bumps draws on Grabel [2003].
13. Note that for the reasons advanced earlier, Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart [2000, 107-110] do
not speak to the issue of an ex post policy response to the information revealed by predictors. In a
frustratingly brief discussion they speak rather vaguely to the ex-ante policy implications of their
early warning system.
14. It is certainly possible that activation of trip wires in one country could aggravate contagion risk in
those countries that investors have reason to perceive as being vulnerable to similar difficulties. This
risk could be mitigated through the use of “contagion” trip wires. These would be activated (in “country
B”) whenever speed bumps are implemented in a country that investors have reason to view similarly
(“country A”). In such circumstances, country B would then implement appropriate speed bumps.
15. Dodd [2000], Kregel [1998], and Neftci [1998] demonstrate the significant role of off-balance sheet
activities in the Asian financial crisis.
16. See Grabel [2003] and Chang and Grabel [2003-04] for extensive examinations of these and related
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